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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act which 
was passed into law in the United States on July 21, 2010 in response to the recent financial 
crisis.  It particularly focuses on the parts of the bill related to the markets for structured 
financial products and credit ratings agencies.  The paper reviews the issues that led to the 
crisis as well as the theory that helps to explain the causes of these issues.  It then goes on to 
analyze the recently passed legislation in light of these issues and the relevant theory, and 
discusses the likely positive effects as well as the likely shortcomings of the different pieces of 
legislation. 
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1. Introduction  
The debate over the regulation of markets has existed ever since the creation of markets 
themselves.  From the grain markets of the Roman Empire to the rice markets in medieval 
Japan, markets around the world have often been regulated by a central authority.  Although it 
has not always been the case, regulation of markets has typically been with the intention of 
accomplishing two things: the protection of less informed market participants, and the 
prevention of market failure.  Still, there are notable economists, such as Adam Smith and 
Milton Friedman, who claim that the best way to achieve market efficiency is without 
regulation.   
The debate between free and regulated markets seems to be never-ending, and is particularly 
apparent in the post-2008 financial crisis world.  In July 2010 a series of financial reforms, 
dubbed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, were passed in the 
United States.  Besides the typical free-market vs. regulation debate, many skeptics have asked 
whether more regulation is really what we need to solve the issues that exist in the U.S. 
financial system.  In order for this new regulation to help, it must solve a problem that was 
previously left unsolved by either the natural corrections of the market or by previous 
regulation, and its benefit must be greater than the adverse effect it may have on the rest of 
the market.   
The purpose of this paper will be to introduce the challenges leaders face in the post-financial 
crisis world, and to critically analyze the recently passed legislation specifically relating to the 
markets for structured financial products, and credit ratings agencies.  The reason for the 
special focus on these areas is due to the central role that structured financial products and 
their rating had in the recent crisis.  In order for the Dodd Frank act to be considered largely 
successful, it must solve these central problems without greatly hampering the financial 
markets as a whole.  Since it is not possible to take precise measurements of all of the effects 
that these regulations are likely to have, this analysis will be largely qualitative and theoretical.  
It will involve an analysis of the theory that the different pieces of regulation are directly or 
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indirectly based upon.  In light of this theory an analysis of the regulations themselves and the 
effect that they are likely to have, will then be conducted. 
2. Theory 
2.1. Asymmetric Information 
The need for financial regulation stems from the fact that there is a tremendous amount of 
asymmetric information in financial markets.  For example, firms know more about the risks 
that they take than their customers and many investors, just as the borrowers of mortgages 
know more about their ability to repay loans than the mortgage brokers that issued the loans.  
Without asymmetric information there would be no need for financial regulation as all parties 
would have the information they need to make the most rational decision.  Since this is not 
possible, financial regulation should attempt to correct for the negative effects of asymmetric 
information while imposing as little disturbance on the positive natural dynamics of the market 
as possible.  As such, each of the models presented in this section deals with issues caused by 
information asymmetry which the proposed financial regulations are intended to correct in 
order to secure the financial system. 
2.2. Principal-Agent Model 
Bernard Salanié (1994) describes how contract theory is necessary to compensate for general 
equilibrium theory when information asymmetries are present.1  Contract theory depends 
heavily upon use of game theory and the principal-agent model.  The principal-agent model is 
comprised of two parties: the uninformed party (the principal), and the informed party (the 
agent), who has information that is valuable to the uninformed party.2  The models involving 
the principal-agent paradigm typically describe the constraints imposed on the relationship 
through explicit (guaranteed by a third party) or implicit (guaranteed by an observable 
equilibrium that neither party has an incentive to break) contracts.3  
                                                          
1
 Salané, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Second Edition, English Translation 2005 
2
 Ibid 
3
 Ibid 
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Salanié notes that different strategic games can be separated by which party moves first and 
whether the situation depends upon actions that the agent takes, or characteristics of or 
information held by agent.4 
2.3. Signaling  
In signaling models, the principal is imperfectly informed about characteristics of, or 
information held by the agent, but the agent moves first.5  In a more general definition, 
signaling refers to the agent revealing some useful information about itself so that the principal 
can make a more informed decision.  Sometimes signaling can be initiated by the agent on his 
or her own behalf, while other times signaling can be required by the principal as a prerequisite 
to entering into a contractual relationship with the agent.  Signaling will be discussed mostly in 
conjunction with the other principal-agent listed in this section.  
2.4. Adverse selection 
Adverse selection describes a group of situations where the principal is imperfectly informed 
about characteristics of, or information held by the agent, and where the principal makes the 
first move in the situation.6 
Following is a modified example of a Basic Model of Capital Markets with Adverse Selection 
shown by Freixas and Rochet (1997).7 While this example deals with entrepreneurs financing 
their products through capital markets, it can be related to many other situations including the 
relationship between mortgage seekers and mortgage brokers.  A description of this will be 
provided after the example. 
Consider a group of entrepreneurs who each own a risky project requiring an initial investment 
equal to 1.  The net returns from this investment (Ŕ(Ѳ)) of these investments follow a normal 
distribution of mean Ѳ and variance ς2.  While the variance is the same for all projects, the 
mean differs across projects, and is the privately held information held by each entrepreneur. 
                                                          
4
 Salané, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Second Edition, English Translation 2005 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, 1997 
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The statistical distribution of the means in the population is common knowledge.  The investors 
are risk neutral and have access to costless storage technology.  The entrepreneurs have initial 
wealth W0 which is greater than 1 available to finance their projects, but they would prefer to 
sell the projects to the capital markets because they are risk averse.  They have an exponential 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of u(w)=-e-ρw, where w represents their final wealth 
and ρ > 0 is their absolute index of risk aversion.  If the mean were observable, each 
entrepreneur would sell its project to the market at a price P(Ѳ) = E*Ŕ(Ѳ)+=Ѳ and would be 
perfectly insured.  The final wealth of an entrepreneur with type Ѳ would be W0+Ѳ. 
Now suppose that Ѳ is private information and that entrepreneurs are indistinguishable by 
investors.  The price of equity (P) is the same for all firms.  Under this scenario, only 
entrepreneurs with a lower expected return will sell their project. 
Entrepreneurs that self finance their project will obtain: 
Eu(W0+Ŕ(Ѳ)) = u(W0+Ѳ-.5ρς
2) 
Entrepreneurs that sell their project to the market will obtain: 
u(W0+P) 
Therefore, entrepreneurs will only sell their project to the financial market if: 
 Ѳ<Ѳ’=P+.5ρς2 
This puts investors in a bad situation where information asymmetry forces them to choose from 
among the worst projects. 
In some cases, entrepreneurs can use partial self-financing as a signaling tool to try and signal 
to investors that they possess a high quality project.  This relies on investors being convinced 
that other entrepreneurs with low quality projects will have no interest in even partially self-
financing their poor quality projects.  In order for this to occur, investors must be convinced 
that the self-financed fraction of the investment (α) is significant enough to deter mimicking 
from entrepreneurs with poor projects. 
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In this scenario, the “no mimicking” condition is: 
u(W0+Ѳ1) ≥ Eu(W0+(1-α)Ѳ2+αŔ(Ѳ1))  
The left side of the equation is the utility of a type Ѳ1 when he sells his entire project at a low 
(appropriate) price P1 = Ѳ1. The right side of the equation represents his expected utility when 
he tries to mimic type Ѳ2.  In the case where he mimics type Ѳ2, he sells a fraction (1-α) of his 
project at a high price P2= Ѳ2, but retains the risk inherent in his owned fraction (α). 
This is a good example of fundamental human behavior.  People will try to maximize their 
benefit and minimize their costs.  If people are not willing to hold at least a share of the risk, it 
signals that they do not expect to gain from the project. In practice, holding a share of the risk 
not only acts as a signal to others, but it also tends to cause people to put in more effort as they 
will be more affected by the outcome of the project.  
2.5. Moral Hazard 
In moral hazard models the principal makes the first move, and is uninformed about the actions 
of the agent.8 A more general explanation of moral hazard involves the agent’s handling of risk 
on behalf of the principal.  Moral hazard occurs when an agent makes risky decisions that affect 
the principal, that the agent would not make if he were less insulated from risk.   
The following is a model of the Credit Market with Moral Hazard by Freixas and Rochet (1997).9  
It deals with a firm’s attempts to gain financing for a project with a size normalized to one.  In 
this example, the amount of financing that the firm needs = R.  There is a 0 risk-free rate of 
return on assets.  The firm has the option to choose between a good (safe) technology which 
produces result G with probability πG, and a bad (risky) technology which produces result B with 
probability πB.  Only good projects have an expected Net Present Value (eNPV) above one    
(πGG > 1 > πBB), despite the fact that B>G.  This implies that πG > πB.  In this case the success of 
the investment is verifiable by outsiders, but the firm’s choice of technology and return are not.  
Assume also that this project is the firm’s only source of cash and that the firm’s success or 
                                                          
8
 Salané, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Second Edition, English Translation 2005 
9
 Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, 1997 
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failure rests on this project.  Because of these conditions, the firm repays R only in the case of 
success, and repays 0 in case of failure. 
With this in mind, the firm will make its technology choice based upon expected profit = πi(i-R). 
This means that the firm will only choose the good technology if: 
 πG (G – R) > πB (B – R) 
Since πG >  πB, this expression is equal to: 
R < RC =        
RC represents the critical value of debt above which the firm will choose the bad technology 
even though the probability of failure is much higher.  From the lender’s point of view, RC < G < 
B.  This means that the lender gets no additional benefit from outcome B relative to the benefit 
from outcome A.  As such, the probability of repayment (p) depends on R: 
p(R) = πG if R  RC and p(R) = πB if R > RC  
In order for there to be equilibrium in the credit market without monitoring, the expected 
return on R for investors must be equal to one (p(R)R = 1).  Under the assumptions mentioned 
above, lending will only occur if πGRC > 1. If πGRC < 1, there will be no lending as lenders will 
have a negative expected NPV.   
As mentioned earlier, there is no incentive for lenders to want the company to choose the risky 
technology in any circumstance because they receive the same return (R) either way.  
Information asymmetry makes it impossible for the lender to know which technology the 
company will choose.  In this example, the lender can attempt to align the borrower’s choice 
with the lender’s best choice by offering a rate that is low enough so that the borrower’s 
expected value (profit) from choosing the good technology is higher than his expected value 
from choosing the bad technology.   
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The problem with this scenario in the real world is that often the potential return from a risky 
decision is so much larger than the return from a safe decision, that it makes it difficult for the 
expected profit from the safe decision to eclipse that of the risky decision. This causes moral 
hazard to be a much larger problem.   
Without information asymmetry, the lender would have the ability to charge the borrower a 
rate that could efficiently compensate for the level of risk in the borrower’s decision.  It is 
sometimes possible to eliminate much of this information asymmetry through regulation and 
monitoring, but this imposes an additional cost.  The following example is also from Freixas and 
Rochet 1997, and builds upon the previous example.10     
A monitoring technology is introduced at cost C.  Using this, banks can prevent borrowers from 
using the bad technology.  Given perfect competition between banks, the nominal value of 
bank loans with monitoring (Rm) at equilibrium is determined by the break even condition: 
 πGRm = 1 + C  
In order for equilibrium to occur, two conditions are necessary: 
The first is that the cost of monitoring, and thus the nominal value of loans (Rm) must be less 
than the NPV of the good project (G).  Given the above condition, this gives: 
πGG – 1 > C 
The second condition is that direct lending which is less costly must be impossible. 
πGRC > 1 
Therefore bank lending is at equilibrium for intermediate values of the probability: 
 πG(πG )  
                                                          
10
 Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, 1997  
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If monitoring cost C is small enough so that  > , then firms will finance projects 
themselves for high probabilities of success, borrow from banks for intermediate probabilities 
of success, and not finance projects with a low probability of success since they won’t be able 
to gain financing from banks, and won’t have an incentive to finance themselves.  
As shown above, individual banks need to weigh the costs of monitoring against the benefits.  
The same goes for the government when it comes to regulation.  Government regulation, 
especially when it comes in the form of oversight organizations, does have a steep cost in terms 
of tax money.  Regulation can also impose costs by disrupting the natural workings of the 
market.  
Unfortunately, the moral hazard problem is quite common in business as the agent typically 
does not carry as much of the risk as the principal does.  Moral hazard problems were major 
contributors to the financial crisis, and are the subject of much of the proposed financial 
regulation in the US right now.  Examples of these problems will be provided throughout the 
paper. 
2.6. Risk Shifting 
That the amount of money and credit available are important determinants of asset prices.  
Asset bubbles, or the inflation in the price of certain assets, are often started or catalyzed by an 
expansion of available credit.  While later sections will go into more detail on asset bubbles, this 
section will present a concept called risk shifting which is another factor that can exacerbate 
asset bubbles.  Risk shifting stems from the principal agent problem where the principal is 
unable to observe the actions of the agent, and is closely related to the moral hazard 
problem.11  Risk shifting is common when the providers of investment funds are unable to 
observe the characteristics of investments made by a third party investor on the provider’s 
behalf.12  Risk shifting can cause moral hazard which leads to the agent making overly risky 
investments.  When this happens on a large scale it causes the prices of risky assets to be bid up 
                                                          
11
 Allen and Gale, Understanding Financial Crises, 2007 
12
 Ibid 
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above their fundamental values.13  It follows that the amount of risk shifting, i.e. the amount of 
credit provided through third parties, is a major determinant of the severity of asset bubbles.  
The following is an example of risk shifting provided by Allen and Gale (2007).14  It 
demonstrates how risky assets are bid up due to risk shifting by comparing a “fundamental” 
case where investors invest on their own behalf, to an intermediated case where investors 
must invest through an unobservable third party.  They consider it a “bubble” when the price of 
an asset rises above the price determined in the “fundamental” case. 
In both cases there are two dates, t = 1,2.  There are also two assets, a safe asset which is in 
variable supply, and a risky asset in fixed supply.  For each 1 unit invested in the safe asset at 
date 1, the return is 1.5 at date 2.  There is only 1 unit of the risky asset, and for this asset the 
return at date 2 is 6 with a 25% probability and 1 with a 75% probability.  This leads to an 
expected payoff of 2.25 at date 2.  Since there is a fixed supply on the risky asset, the price will 
be determined through bidding in the market.  Let P represent the price of this risky asset. 
In the fundamental case, each investor has 1 unit of wealth initially and invests her own wealth 
directly.  Investors are risk neutral.  The price of the risky asset can be determined by the 
following: 
  =             and so P= 1.5 
This shows that risk-neutral investors investing their own funds will only bid up the risky asset 
to the level where the expected rate of return is the same from each type of asset. 
In the intermediated case, investors have no wealth of their own.  They can borrow at a rate of 
33.33%.  The maximum amount that they can borrow is 1.  If they borrow at t = 1, they pay back 
1.33 at t = 2 if they are able to.  If they are unable to pay back the full amount, they pay 
whatever they have.  Because of this, borrowers are only interested in the upper part of the 
                                                          
13
 Allen and Gale, Understanding Financial Crises, 2007 
14
 Ibid 
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distribution of returns on the risky asset.  Lenders are unable to observe how the investors 
invest the money.   
If an investor invests in the safe asset he will receive the following return after the loan is paid 
back: 
1.5 – 1.33 = 0.17 
If instead the investor was able to invest in the risky asset at the price determined in the 
fundamental case, he would be able to purchase 1/1.5 unit of the risky asset.  In this case, the 
investor would have the following expected return: 
.25((1/1.5 x 6) – 1.33) + .75(0) = 0.67 
While the borrower would have the following expected return: 
.25(1.33) + .75(1 x (1/1.5)) = .83  
In this case there is only a 25% chance that the lender will get paid back in full.  The interest 
rate that the lender charged is far too low to compensate for this amount of risk.  In order to 
get the same 33% expected return, he would need to charge have a 232% interest rate as 
shown below: 
.25(3.32) + .75(1 x (1/1.5)) = 1.33 
For the borrower in this case, the risky asset with expected return 0.67 is preferred over the 
safe asset with a 0.5 larger payoff.  For the lender, the expected return when the borrower 
invests in the risky asset is 0.5 less than when he invests in the safe asset.  This 0.5 change in 
expected return is shifted from the lender to the borrower when the risk is shifted from the 
borrower to the lender.  The lender cannot prevent this since the investment decisions of the 
borrower are unobservable. 
In equilibrium with a variable amount of the safe asset and a fixed amount of the risky asset, 
the price of the risky asset will be bid up until the point where the expected return of 
borrowers is the same regardless of which asset they invest in.  This is shown below: 
14 
 
.25((1/P) x 6 – 1.33) + .75 x 0 = .17 
P = 3 
In this case there is a bubble with the price of the risky asset being twice as high as it is in the 
fundamental case.   
Another very relevant point brought up by Allen and Gale (2007) is that the amount of risk 
shifted depends on the how risky the asset is.15  This is often reflected in the price of the asset 
as the riskier the asset is the greater potential for shifted risk and thus the more the asset can 
be bid up before it returns the same as the safe asset.  This is demonstrated in the extension of 
the previous example shown below.16   
The situation is the same as in the previous example except that the return on the risky asset is 
9 with a 25% probability and 0 with a 75% probability, reflecting additional risk.  This yields the 
same expected return of 2.25 as in the earlier example.  The price determination of the risky 
asset is: 
.25(1/P x 9 – 1.33) + .75(0) = .17 
P = 4.5  
In this case, even more risk is shifted to lenders leading to an expected return for lenders of: 
.25(1.33) + .75(0) = .33 
In order for lenders to be properly compensated for this level of risk and still earn a .33 return, 
they would need to charge a 432% interest rate: 
.25(5.32) + .75(0) = 1.33 
Lenders will often proceed with lending despite this problem when there is a limited supply of 
the risky asset.  This is because it will only be worth it for a relatively small proportion of 
borrowers to invest in the risky asset.  The rest of the borrowers will invest in the safe asset and 
                                                          
15
 Allen and Gale, Understanding Financial Crises, 2007 
16
 Ibid 
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be able to pay the lender back in full resulting in an expected return somewhere between the 
return where borrowers invest in the safe asset, and where they invest in the risky asset, 
depending on the supply of the risky asset.17       
 
3. Overarching Issues related to Financial Crises 
3.1. Systemic Risk / Contagion 
Isolated issues in financial markets have the potential to develop into crises due to systemic 
risk.  Systemic risk is defined as the risk that the failure of one significant financial institution 
can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions as a 
result of their linkages to each other.18  Systemic risk can cause market failure due to different 
types of financial contagion.  One type of financial contagion is due to information asymmetry.  
When market participants do not know which institutions are healthy and which are not, a 
small shock to one or institution can shake the trust in the entire market.  In the banking 
industry for example, this has been known to cause bank runs where depositors rush to 
withdraw their funds so as to avoid losing them to what could be an unhealthy institution.  The 
problem is that this often results in the failure of otherwise healthy institutions along with the 
unhealthy institutions.  In general, the larger the scale of information asymmetry is, the greater 
potential there is for contagion, and thus the larger the threat that systemic risk poses.19    
However, contagion still occurs without a large degree of information asymmetry.20  Another 
type of contagion occurs when a failed institution’s obligations to other institutions lose their 
value, hurting the financial health of the institutions that held those obligations.21  If this causes 
                                                          
17
 Allen and Gale, Understanding Financial Crises, 2007 
18
 Scott, Hal, The Regulation of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, March 2010 
19
 Kodres and Pritsker, A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion, Journal of Finance, April 2002 
20
 Saez and Shi, Liquidity Pools, Risk Sharing and Financial Contagion, Journal of Financial Services Research, 2004 
21
 Allen and Gale, Financial Contagion, Working Papers 98-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York 
University, 1998 
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these institutions to fail or hinders them from paying their obligations to other institutions, it 
can cause a chain reaction that can threaten the financial system as a whole.22 
If financial regulation is to be successful, it must curb the issues that lead to shocks and failures, 
as well as eliminate the systemic risk that spread these issues throughout the financial system.   
3.2. Limited Liability 
A major obstacle that regulators and market participants need to take into account is the fact 
that modern financial systems allow for the limited liability of many market participants.  
Whenever principal-agent issues in markets are discussed, much of the focus inevitably falls 
upon brokers and other service providing businesses lacking the incentives to offer the best 
possible service to principal that hired them.  Another issue that affects markets, but is usually 
reserved for discussions about corporate governance, is the limited liability that decision 
makers within a business often have.     
Large corporations and small limited liability companies among other types of protective 
registrations allow people to act without needing to worry about losing their personal wealth.  
Whenever decision makers are detached from personally being affected by the consequences 
of their decisions, it creates problems in the markets which they act.  In other words, even if it 
were possible to align the incentives of firms operating in markets, issues would still exist as the 
personal incentives of decision makers in the firm are often not aligned with the incentives of 
the firm itself.  While the issue of aligning the incentives of the decision makers with the 
owners falls under the realm of corporate governance which is not typically an area that is 
regulated by central authorities, it still has effects on markets and on the potential 
effectiveness of regulations. 
Decision makers in businesses often take risky decisions because a negative outcome has a 
limited scope of damage on them personally.  Bankruptcies of companies with limited liability 
protection result in the liquidation of the firm’s assets while most of the personal possessions 
                                                          
22
 Scott, Hal, The Regulation of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, March 2010 
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of the decision makers and owners remain protected by law.  This allows decision makers and 
owners to view themselves as though they are holding a call option on the value of the firm.23  
This is especially true for owners of small, newly started firms.  Due to the downside protection 
that limited liability offers, owners often face a moral hazard problem when they acquire 
financing, and will often make risky decisions that offer the greatest possible upside.  The value 
of options increase with volatility as the potential upside is larger while the downside is 
eliminated by the protection the option offers.  This same principle can also act as a catalyst for 
moral hazard, as owners who feel like they are holding an option attempt to maximize potential 
return by increasing risk, and thus volatility.        
3.3. Asset Bubbles  
One factor that has been a large contributing factor in many financial crises is the existence of 
some sort of asset bubble.  In order for bubbles to occur, there is almost always an expansion of 
money or credit either just prior to, or during the bubble’s formation.  Also, as mentioned 
earlier, risk shifting is another factor which causes the prices of risky assets to be bid up to 
artificially high levels.  When these things occur, any contraction in the money or credit supply 
could cause the bubble to “burst” and cause the inflated asset values to fall.   
This is not the end of the story however, as this asset revaluation causes a chain reaction which 
can affect the entire financial system due to systemic risk.  As the values of companies’ assets 
fall so too do their stock prices.  This causes panic throughout the stock market as investors 
race to get their money out of the market.  It also causes major problems for banks.  In addition 
to investors pulling their money out of stock markets, some people inevitably withdraw their 
deposits from banks.  If too many people do this at once, it can put a huge strain on the banks.  
This is because banks inevitably lose much of the value of their own assets when the bubble 
bursts.  It is also due to a more fundamental problem in the banking system, that being that 
banks borrow short and lend long.  In other words, people deposit money in banks which can 
be withdrawn on very short notice, while banks often lend money to people with the 
expectation of it being paid back over a very long period of time.  This can cause banks to 
                                                          
23
 Bienz, Venture Capital, Private Equity and IPO’s, Norges Handelshøyskole, Autumn 2009 
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liquidate their relatively illiquid assets for well below their true value, further adding to the 
downward spiral of asset prices. 
If one or more banks begin to fail, it can lead to widespread panic, (contagion) causing bank 
runs, which can even lead to the failure of banks that were still in sound financial shape after 
the asset bubble burst.   These days, the failure of one bank can also lead to the failure of 
others because of how interconnected the financial system is.  Often, governments are forced 
to step in and guarantee deposits and bail-out firms whose failure could affect the entire 
financial system.  This was exactly the case in the recent (2008) financial crisis, and it will be 
discussed in further detail later in this paper.    
 
4. Issues Related to the 2008 Financial Crisis  
4.1. Structured financial products 
Structured finance has the broad definition of “all advanced private and public arrangements 
that serve to efficiently refinance and hedge any profitable economic activity beyond the scope 
of conventional forms of on-balance sheet securities (debt, bonds, equity) at lower capital costs 
and agency costs from market impediments and liquidity constraints.24” Lower capital and 
agency costs from market impediments and liquidity constraints refer to the fact that 
structured financial products aim to take relatively illiquid assets such as mortgages which can 
typically only be held by large, specialized organizations such as banks, and turn them into 
liquid assets that can be held by a wider array of investors.  There are many types of asset 
backed securities (ABS). For the purposes of this paper, we will only discuss three of the 
structured financial products that were most central to the recent financial crisis, those being 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), mortgage backed securities (MBS), and credit default 
swaps (CDS). 
4.1.1. Collateralized Debt Obligations 
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Collateralized debt obligations are groups of high yield assets such as risky bonds, or other asset 
backed securities which are pooled and then divided into various groups, called tranches.25  
These different tranches, are designed so that the upper levels are protected from default by 
requiring that a large proportion of the underlying assets  default before the top level securities 
are affected.26  The lower levels are much riskier, and as such, offer a higher rate of return to 
investors.  The different levels are also often paid out at different time periods.   
Collateralized debt obligation tranches that fall below the desired default probability (giving 
them a poor credit rating) were often packaged further into CDO2s.  The principle behind a 
CDO2 is basically the same as with a CDO in that it is a group of risky assets, in this case other 
CDOs, packaged so that the top levels of the security get paid out as long as an unexpectedly 
large proportion of the underlying CDOs do not fail.  CDO2s were even more risky than regular 
CDOs however as the extra level of leverage made them even more susceptible to small errors 
in the assumed default rate and the assumed recovery rate on defaults.27 
4.1.1.1. Issues related to CDOs 
Due to the complexity of CDOs and CDO2s, there was a tremendous amount of asymmetric 
information between the issuer of the security and the buyer (the end lender of the products 
backing the security).  Information asymmetry of this level often leads to the exploitation of the 
less-informed party. As mentioned, the main purpose of most types of regulation is to correct 
for this information asymmetry.  Leading up to the financial crisis, the task of analyzing these 
complex products and reporting their risk level to potential buyers was left to private ratings 
agencies.  While the many issues related to this will be discussed in detail in a later section, it is 
worth noting here that the false confidence that buyers were given by information provided by 
ratings agencies really allowed issuers to exploit buyers.  In essence, issuers were able to 
transfer a large amount of risk to buyers while only compensating them for a fraction of that 
risk.  While it is unclear whether or not issuers knew the full extent of the risk behind these 
products, they did know that the level risk protection was based on assumptions, which, if 
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wrong by even a small amount, completely altered the model.28  This will also be described in a 
later section.         
4.1.2. Mortgage backed securities  
Mortgage backed securities are composed of portfolios of mortgage loans packaged together 
and divided into groups of securities each containing pieces of a large number of different 
loans. They are often divided between residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and 
corporate mortgage backed securities (CMBS). They can also include other types of housing and 
property related debt such as home-equity loans. 
One type of MBS is a collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO).  Like CDO’s, these are typically 
divided into different tranches where the upper levels are senior to the lower, riskier levels.  
Also like with CDOs, there exist CMO2s which are composed of lower tranches of CMOs 
combined to form another group of securities, many of which had the same assumed risk as the 
upper level CMOs.      
Mortgage backed securities are also designed to give risk protection in the form of 
diversification due to the fact that the securities are composed of many mortgages from 
different geographic areas.  However, this level of geographic diversification protection turned 
out to be much less effective than most people expected, leading to the failure of important 
assumptions upon which the risk level of a particular security was often based.   
As with any asset backed security, the qualities of MBS’ are highly affected by the quality of 
their underlying assets.  In the years leading up to the financial crisis, it became increasingly 
common for MBS’ to be composed of subprime mortgage loans.  Subprime mortgage loans are 
loans given to borrowers who are seen as having a higher risk of default.  Subprime mortgages 
are issued with higher interest rates in order to compensate for the higher risk. The demand for 
securities composed of subprime mortgages allowed banks and mortgage brokers to issue more 
of these high risk mortgages with little risk to themselves.  It also spread this risk throughout 
the financial system through the holders of these securities.         
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This system has helped the US housing market to grow for more than 30 years29 by allowing 
banks to serve as match-makers as well as lenders.  The system seemed to function well as long 
as housing prices were rising and people could continue to borrow against the increasing value 
of their homes.  However, as we have seen recently when the housing bubble burst, the values 
of these securities were greatly affected, spreading dramatic losses throughout the financial 
system. 
4.1.2.1. Issues related to Mortgage Backed Securities 
Referring to the example of adverse selection in the previous section, it is not difficult to 
imagine a similar situation occurring between a mortgage broker and a mortgage seeker.  If the 
mortgage broker is risk-neutral (as appeared to often be the case in reality), and they offer 
subprime mortgages with high rates relative to normal mortgages, they will encounter an 
adverse selection problem as only mortgage seekers who can’t get better terms, and are likely 
to default, will take out subprime mortgages. 
Similarly, signaling can be used as a tool with mortgages to weed-out mortgage-seekers who 
know that they are unlikely to have the ability to pay down the mortgage.  This is one of the 
main reasons that quality mortgages usually require a large down-payment. 
In hindsight, it appears that this adverse selection problem was largely understood by subprime 
mortgage brokers, as most of them attempted to rid themselves of the risk associated with 
actually holding these mortgages.  Instead it was more of an example of a principal-agent and 
moral hazard problem with the mortgage brokers acting as the agents to investors who bought 
the mortgages from them.  Often, mortgage brokers would act as matchmakers between loan 
seekers and lenders.  In this capacity they carried zero risk since they never actually lent any 
money.  In other instances mortgage brokers would issue a subprime mortgage, but only hold it 
for a very short time before it was sold to an intermediary, often to an investment bank, which 
would package it into a CMO or CDO and sell it.  In this capacity they acted as underwriters of 
the loans, holding the risk for only a relatively short time before shifting it to another.   
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As in the risk shifting example, since brokers carried very little risk they were able to in a sense, 
overbid for risky assets by offering subprime mortgages to the riskiest of borrowers.  The risk, 
and thus the potential for loss was then passed on to the purchasers of the securities.  As with 
other types of structured financial products, CMOs composed of subprime mortgages were 
then rated by independent ratings agencies which failed to provide an accurate assessment of 
this risk.  Buyers of these securities believed the ratings and thought that the possible moral 
hazard and risk shifting issues associated with the creation of these securities had been 
mitigated by the existence of the ratings agencies.  This caused buyers to require a rate of 
return much lower than the rate they should have required given the level of risk that they 
were holding.       
4.1.3. Credit Default Swaps 
Credit default swaps act like insurance to the buyer of the swap.  The issuer of the swap agrees 
to pay the par value of the bond if the bond defaults.30  This effectively transfers the risk 
another level to the swap issuer, and can have the effect of spreading the risk further through 
the financial system.  Credit default swaps were originally used to provide protection against 
the default of corporate bonds.31  Swaps sold on structured financial products were different 
from swaps on corporate bonds in that they would trigger payments as mortgages defaulted 
affecting the owned tranche, rather than triggering one lump-sum payment when the entire 
corporate bond defaults.32  
In addition to providing downside protection for owners of an asset, credit default swaps on 
structured financial products were often used in a speculative manner.  Unlike normal 
insurance contracts, Credit default swaps could be bought and traded without actually owning 
the security that the swap is for.33  In these cases, the issuer of the swap was essentially betting 
that the security that it insured was not going to default, while the buyer of the swap was 
essentially betting that the security would default.  The speculative power of credit default 
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swaps became even greater when indices were created on the average values of baskets of 
swaps.34  This allowed investors to speculate on the larger sum of assets behind a range of 
credit default swaps, such as CDOs and CMOs.   
The market for credit default swaps in the years leading up to the financial crisis was estimated 
to be $36 trillion, with a large portion of that being swaps on structured financial products.35  
When the values of structured products deteriorated, these swaps were a major contributor in 
spreading losses throughout the economy.        
4.1.3.1. Issues related to credit default swaps  
Credit default swaps were originally thought to provide a great benefit by allowing financing to 
come from those with available funds, while risk is carried by those both willing and able to do 
so.36  While this worked to an extent, it also allowed for additional risk shifting which gave swap 
buyers the incentive to bid up, and invest in more risky assets.  This likely had a large 
contribution in creating asset bubbles such as the housing bubble which was a major 
contributor to the financial crisis.  They also had the effect of helping to spread systemic risk 
further throughout the financial system.   
Credit default swaps played a part in causing financial institutions to hold structured products 
on their balance sheets in the time leading up to the financial crisis, by giving them a false sense 
of risk protection.  These financial institutions thought they were protected by holding only the 
top tranches of structured products, and by having those tranches backed by credit default 
swaps.  In many some cases, these two forms of “protection” also allowed them to have a 
lower regulatory capital reserve ratios than they would need if they just held the unprotected, 
underlying loans on their books.37  This meant that large amounts of risk were held by 
companies that were not intending to hold it.  Credit default swaps were also often purchased 
by issuers of structured financial products in order to protect them from downside risk while 
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the securities were still on their books.  Losses were then spread to many vulnerable companies 
when the swap issuing company could not meet its obligation to pay.  
There was also another theoretical conflict of interest problem related to credit default swaps.  
It is alleged that lenders holding a CDS as protection often had the adverse incentive to drive 
the borrowing firm into bankruptcy rather than restructure its debt and help it to get healthy 
again.38  This is because lenders could simply be paid back in full by cashing in the CDS.  This 
would free up the money to be used on another investment rather than investing effort and 
time on helping the borrowing company.  
4.2. Credit Ratings Agencies  
Credit ratings agencies have existed since the early twentieth century in order to provide 
investors with information about corporate bonds.39  The idea was that a consistent framework 
would allow investors to reasonably compare risk “within and across sectors and 
geographies.”40 To date, there are a handful of credit ratings agencies which have achieved 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) status from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, but as of the start of the financial crisis, the three largest ratings 
agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch, accounted for more than 
95% of the total ratings issued.41  Achieving NRSRO status is extremely important for ratings 
agencies as many potential buyers, such as corporate pension funds and mutual funds, have 
restrictions regarding the minimum NRSRO rating of securities that they invest in.  Even the US 
government uses ratings to guide the investment of some of its institutions, such as the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) which can only be used to purchase AAA rated 
securities.42  Ratings by NRSROs are important beyond their regulatory uses as private investors 
often use ratings in much the same way as public, and regulated investors do.43  Because of 
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this, there has been a huge demand for securities rated by NRSROs, making the certified ratings 
business very profitable. 
4.2.1. Expanded Role of Credit Ratings 
Ratings agencies and NRSROs in particular began to take on a larger role in the economy after 
changes made to the Net Capital Rule in 1975.  These changes permitted banks to have lower 
marginal capital requirements if the securities they held were rated investment grade by at 
least two NRSROs.44  Eventually, more regulatory responsibility was given to these private 
companies when many buy-side institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds, and 
insurance companies began to rely on NRSRO ratings to comply with regulatory requirements.45  
Many of these companies also began setting internal requirements on their investments based 
on certified ratings.  As this occurred the dynamics in the market for certified ratings changed. 
Originally credit ratings agencies were paid by investors seeking information on potential 
investments, but as dependence on credit ratings increased, this system shifted to the way it is 
today where ratings agencies are mostly paid by the issuers of the security.46  This occurred in 
large part because issuers wanted to have their securities considered for purchase by all of the 
major buyers.      
This change in the way in which rating agencies were paid also caused changes in the 
competitive environment between agencies.  Instead of competing to give the best quality 
ratings, NRSROs often competed to maintain and attract business by pleasing the issuers by 
giving them favorable ratings, especially on structured finance products that were often 
specifically designed to attain a specific rating.47 
It is also alleged that many firms became overly dependent on credit ratings, causing them to 
neglect their own due diligence on investments.48 
                                                          
44
 Mulligan, From AAA to F: How Credit Rating Agencies Failed America, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 50 No. 4 
45
 Amandou, The Systematic Regulation of CRAs and Rated Markets, World Economics; Oct-Dec 2009, Vol. 10 No. 4 
46
 Mulligan, From AAA to F: How Credit Rating Agencies Failed America, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 50 No. 4 
47
 Bassett, Geoum, and Remolona, Risk Management by Structured Derivative Product Companies, Federal Reserve 
Bank of NY Economic Policy Review, April 1996 
48
 Amandou, The Systematic Regulation of CRAs and Rated Markets, World Economics; Oct-Dec 2009, Vol. 10 No. 4 
26 
 
4.2.2. Methodology 
When rating corporate bonds, rating agencies typically have a large amount of reliable 
historical information to base their ratings on and the methodologies that they use to rate 
corporate bonds have been tested over time.  When rating structured financial products 
however, credit ratings agencies did not use a standardized approach, and methodologies were 
often not even standardized within individual ratings agencies.49,50  They also relied heavily on 
key assumptions.  For instance, they assumed low default correlations between the different 
loans comprising a security, they assumed a certain probability of default, and they assumed a 
relatively high recovery rate on defaulted loans.51  For example, it was common to assume a 
65% recovery rate on defaulted sub-prime mortgages.52  However, in hindsight it appears that a 
30% recovery rate is more realistic.53  When these assumptions were off by even a small 
amount they completely altered the results of the model.  Making matters worse is the fact 
that the models were often based upon very unreliable data, as the products were often too 
new to have reliable cyclical data.54  Asset backed securities with these types of errors in the 
assumptions had a much higher chance of default for the all tranches of the security.  This 
means that the ratings based on these incorrect assumptions gave an incorrect picture of the 
true risk posed by different structured financial products.   
4.2.3. Issues related to credit rating agencies 
The issues surrounding credit ratings agencies in the post financial crisis world are of great 
importance due to the vital role ratings agencies have been given in financial markets.  As 
mentioned, NRSROs were heavily relied upon, in both an official and an unofficial capacity to 
correct for information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  When payment for ratings 
shifted from the investor to the issuer, it set the stage for a major moral hazard problem.  
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Investors depended on ratings agencies to act as their agent for investigating and reporting on 
the risk level of different investments.  Many investors relied entirely on ratings agencies due to 
time and expertise it required to accurately assess the risk level of the products that they 
rated.55  This was especially true with structured financial products which are extremely 
complicated.  As mentioned, the dependence on ratings became official for many companies 
and investors when regulatory benchmarks were set based upon NRSRO ratings.  When 
investors stopped paying NRSROs for their ratings, they lost their means to incentivize ratings 
agencies to offer the most accurate ratings possible.  The competitive dynamics in the ratings 
industry also changed dramatically, as individual agencies competed to be the rater of choice of 
issuers, rather than the investors who really depended on the ratings.  This led to raters 
competing to please their “customers,” especially since repeat business was vital to the 
agencies.  Ratings agencies at times even gave advice to issuers of structured products on how 
they could adjust the product to attain a specific rating.56    
The situation was especially prone to spreading systemic risk through investors that were 
supposed to remain at least partly insulated from it when structured financial products were 
allowed to be rated on the same scale as corporate and municipal bonds.  When this happened, 
the comparability of risk within the ratings classes, across sectors, and between structures was 
drastically reduced.57  Many investors who knew the old system thought that they could trust 
ratings on structured products as they did those on standard securities, and did not take the 
additional uncertainty inherent in structured product into account. 
Credit ratings have been major contributors to spreading systemic risk for multiple reasons.  For 
one, as mentioned before, inaccurate ratings allowed risky assets to be held by investors that 
were not in a position to hold such assets, putting them in a dire situation when those assets 
failed.  Also, credit ratings trigger systemic risk through downgrades of certain types of assets.  
During the recent crisis, as ratings agencies made downgrades of sub-prime backed securities, 
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investors lost confidence in the ratings of a much wider range of structured products, causing 
liquidity to dry up.  This put investors in a worse position as they even suffered losses on 
relatively sound securities.58  Ratings downgrades also caused fire sales of assets by investors 
required to hold only products above a certain rating, causing them to take heavy losses as they 
sold off those securities at the same time as many other large investors.    
4.3. How did this happen? 
Providing a detailed explanation of the financial crisis would be a paper in itself.  Following will 
be a relatively brief description of the crisis, aimed at tying together the topics discussed to this 
point, and further setting the background for the rest of the paper.  
Growth not only in developed economies such as the US and those in the EU, but also in 
developing countries, both helped to cause, and was fueled by, a wealth of available credit.  
One of the main reasons that credit was so readily available is because of the relatively low-
levels at which the federal reserve maintained key interest rates in the US.  This helped made it 
possible for banks to issue a large number of mortgages and other housing related loans, such 
as home equity loans.  These loans helped fuel a tremendous amount of personal consumption 
in the US which accounted for more than 70% of GDP in 2007.59  At the same time, a lack of 
regulation allowed for the issuance of a huge number of subprime mortgage loans.60  It got to 
the point where many of these loans were being issued with little or no documentation, little or 
no down-payment, and with what many considered to be deceptive variable interest rates.61  
The issuance of subprime loans was also made possible because of the market for structured 
financial products.  The demand for structured financial products containing risky loans, such as 
subprime mortgages, allowed mortgage brokers and banks to make a profit by issuing these 
loans, but allowed them to avoid most of the risk by passing it on to the holders of the 
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securities containing the loans.  This created a situation where the usual incentives to refrain 
from offering loans that are unlikely to be profitable were nonexistent.   
Easily attainable mortgages helped to inflate a bubble in the housing market. There was an 
artificially high level of competition for houses, pushing the prices higher.  As this occurred, 
many people took out loans on the inflated value of their homes, further compounding the 
problem.   
As mentioned before, most people assumed that structured financial products backed by 
mortgages would have risk protection offered by geographic diversification.  This was based on 
speculation as well as data that were not representative of the economic conditions 
encountered at the beginning of the 21st century.62  We now know that the housing bubble 
stretched across the country, providing almost no diversification protection to securities 
comprised of housing related loans when the bubble burst.   
Structured financial products were in such great demand, in large part because many of them 
held high ratings grades from NRSROs.  Many buy-side firms are restricted in one way or 
another as to the quality of securities they are allowed to invest in.  In certain cases, investors 
are only allowed to invest in AAA-rated bonds.  This combined with an increase in demand for 
low-risk bonds from the rest of the world led to a tremendous demand for AAA-rated corporate 
bonds over the years.63  However, there is and has been a relatively small supply of AAA-rated 
corporate bonds, and as such, returns on AAA-rated corporate bonds were quite low.  When 
structured financial products came on the market and received AAA-ratings using the same 
ratings scale as corporate bonds, they were bought up by firms wanting to get a decent return 
while satisfying their regulatory requirements.  Regarding the returns offered by AAA-
structured financial products relative to AAA-corporate bonds, it seems as though the market 
did anticipated that the structured financial products were more risky than their corporate 
counterparts, as AAA returns for structured products were generally higher.  However, we now 
know that the market did not adjust enough as in hindsight we see that most structured 
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financial products rated AAA should have been rated much lower, and should have required 
even higher returns to compensate for the additional risk.  As a consequence, high levels of risk 
were spread throughout the financial system, in part via groups of firms that had low-risk 
investment strategies.   
Many people wonder how this was allowed to happen.  Some place the blame on the SEC for 
giving regulatory power over buy-side firms to the private credit ratings agencies by giving them 
the power to determine which securities these firms could invest in64.  Others place the blame 
on the US government as a whole for not effectively regulating the competitive dynamics in the 
ratings industry, and for not regulating the methodologies used by the ratings agencies to rate 
structured financial products despite the attempts made with the Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act of 2006 in the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals.65 
Much of the blame is placed on the methodology ratings agencies used to rate structured 
financial products.  As mentioned earlier, ratings agencies relied heavily key on assumptions 
when rating structured financial products.  If assumptions are wrong by even a small margin, 
the models could break down entirely.  Issuers were well aware of the fact that they needed to 
satisfy certain conditions in order to achieve high ratings, and used this knowledge to structure 
products to attain certain ratings.66 Sometimes credit ratings agencies would take it a step 
further and actually give advice as to how issuers could structure their products in order to 
maximize ratings.67  Another issue is the fact that issuers could basically shop for ratings.  If the 
rating given to a product was not what the issuer intended it could simply take the product to 
another agency in order to try to secure a more favorable rating.68 
Also, blame has been placed on the fact that ratings agencies were allowed to use the same 
scale to rate structured financial products as they used to rate corporate bonds.  Apparently 
this was requested by the issuers of structured products so that they would be available to 
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investors with ratings-based restraints.69  This helped to reinforce the notion that structured 
products were the same as corporate bonds, and helped to give investors a false sense of 
familiarity and confidence which may have dissuaded some from conducting their own research 
on the securities.   
Credit ratings also cause systemic risk from the chain-reaction that often accompanies rating 
downgrades.  When ratings downgrades occur, it can lead to ratings based “triggers” which can 
lead to collateral calls.70  This situation is made worse when collateral calls are made on both 
defaulted products, and those that have lost market value due to reduced liquidity as a result of 
a loss of confidence that accompanies a ratings downgrade.  It can also cause contagion as 
investors lose confidence in that ratings system and in securities similar to those that have been 
downgraded.71  This was the case with AIG which had sold billions of dollars with of credit 
default swaps on structured products, notably to Goldman Sachs. This action was likely a 
combination of risky speculation as well as an overreliance on credit ratings by AIG.  As the 
ratings on structured financial products deteriorated, buyers of AIG’s CDS protection called for 
payment.  As this occurred, there was a ratings downgrade on AIG’s own debt.  AIG had 
overextended itself and was not able to meet its obligations on its own debt, forcing the US 
government to step in to save the company, which owed approximately $10 billion to state and 
local governments, and approximately $80 billion in retirement savings, from causing further 
damage to the US financial system.72                     
These effects were made much worse by the degree to which the financial system is 
interconnected.  The failure of Northern Rock in the UK, as well as Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch 
in the US, all of which were heavily invested in subprime mortgages and credit default swaps, 
prompted emergency action to prevent a chain reaction that could threaten the entire financial 
system.73,74  The huge mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also nationalized in 
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order to prevent the possible failure of masses of firms that held debt from the two companies. 
When Lehman Brothers faced a similar situation to that of Bear Stearns in September 2008 the 
US government declined to provide the same guarantees for Lehman Brothers that had secured 
the sale of Bear Stearns.  This made it impossible for Lehman to find a buyer before it was 
forced to declare bankruptcy, as no one wanted to take on the massive amount of “toxic” debt 
that Lehman had on its books.75 The US government declined to back Lehman because it was 
concerned with the effects of moral hazard, and decided that moral hazard posed a larger 
threat than systemic risk.76  However, Lehman was even larger and more interconnected 
throughout the financial system than Bear Stearns was, and so its bankruptcy sent massive 
shocks throughout the system.  The credit markets froze almost completely as no companies 
wanted to lend for fear that the borrower would fail and not be able to repay its debt.  This 
greatly affected AIG which was in desperate need for cash in order to meet its obligations on 
credit default swaps.   
Eventually, Congress was forced to pass a bill that allowed the government to both buy toxic 
assets from companies, as well as take a direct stake in companies if necessary.  It made use of 
both of these tools, spending billions of dollars buying back toxic assets, and investing to rescue 
troubled but interconnected companies like AIG. 
4.3.1. Issues related to the Government’s reaction to the financial crisis 
Many people have taken exception to the government’s handling of the financial crisis, 
particularly because of its apparent lack of consistency regarding big firms in trouble.  Many 
people in the government, including then Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, detested 
buyouts because they feared that they lead to moral hazard.77  Buyouts lead to moral hazard 
when firms take excessively risky actions because they think they will receive a bailout if they 
fail.  The government let Lehman Brothers fail in order to deter this moral hazard.  This was 
viewed as extremely inconsistent because the government had previously bailed out Bear 
Stearns (under the table through an acquisition by JP Morgan), and would go on to provide 
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guarantees and bailouts that would save most of the other major troubled firms on Wall Street. 
The claim is that the government was forced to do this because of the level of systemic risk that 
had spread throughout the financial system.  Still, the government received major criticism for 
its actions, and it is with this history in mind that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act was created to prevent this type of action from happening again.   
 
5. Analysis of Proposed Regulation 
Financial regulation has always had its share of skeptics.  Many people are concerned that the 
costs regulations impose on financial markets outweigh the benefits they bring.  Certainly this is 
hard to generalize as there are many different regulations in the US and the world, each with 
their own set of costs and benefits.  Still, we know that each regulation that is implemented has 
costs.  There are direct costs involved in setting up and running the regulatory institution as 
well as indirect costs to the market.  Because of this, it is rational to expect that the people 
designing these regulations would give their best efforts to make sure that the rationale behind 
each regulation was sound so that the intended benefits could be realized at the lowest 
possible cost.  However, it appears that this is often not the case.  It is claimed by some that 
“the development of financial regulation has been an empirical process, a matter of trial and 
error, driven by the exigencies of history rather than by formal theory.”78  Regulations are often 
also shaped by political motives, sometimes causing unnecessary and/or inefficient suggestions 
to be included in measures for the sake of appeasing the electorate, special interest groups, 
and/or opposing party members. 
In December 2009, the House of Representatives of the 111th Congress of the United States 
passed H.R. 4173: Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.  The Senate’s 
version of the bill was passed in June 2010.  In July 2010, the reconciled joint bill, which has 
come to be known as the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, was sent to President Barak Obama 
and was signed on July 21, 2010.  The more than 1000-page bill aims to solve several issues 
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which contributed to the financial crisis, at once.  In addition to stricter standards across much 
of the financial system, it aims to create several new regulatory agencies to increase consumer 
protection, and minimize systemic risk.  In the wake of the passage of the Dodd-Frank bill, it is 
not possible for us to know the motives for which each part of the legislation was created, 
although it is likely that the aforementioned issues played a significant role in the shaping of the 
bill.    
This section of the paper will focus specifically on reforms related to structured financial 
products/derivatives, and credit ratings agencies.  It will analyze these reforms based on the 
issues that they were created to resolve, in light of the theory behind those issues.  It will weigh 
in on likely benefits as well as likely shortcomings, and will mention developments that are 
likely to occur as a result of these reforms.   
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Figure one shows the role that regulation plays in trying to solve issues affecting financial 
markets.  Regulation can attempt to solve a particular issue by either focusing on the root cause 
of a problem, the problem itself, or sometimes both.  Fixing the root cause is certainly more 
ideal as it often also helps to correct other related issues and may help prevent future issues, 
however this is also often more difficult to solve.  The figure also shows how regulation can 
create unintended consequences that have the potential to disrupt the market even as the 
original issues are solved.  The results of these balancing acts among the different pieces of 
legislation will determine whether or not the overall bill is considered a success or a failure.  
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5.1. Credit Risk Retention Act of 2009 
-Amends the Securities Act of 1933 to direct the appropriate federal financial regulatory 
agencies to prescribe regulations to require any creditor to retain an economic interest in a 
material portion of the credit risk of any loan the creditor transfers, sells, or conveys to a third 
party, including for the purpose of including such loan in a pool of loans backing an issuance of 
asset-backed securities.79        –Library of Congress 
The Credit Risk Retention Act of 2009 takes aim at the moral hazard and risk shifting problems 
that are apparent in the credit market.  It specifically targets subprime lenders with its mention 
of loans that back an issuance of asset-backed securities.   
As mentioned before, issuers of loans that backed asset-backed securities were able to do what 
they did because they were almost never the actual lender (risk holder) for a long period of 
time.  They either acted as matchmakers (agents) for the actual lender (principal), or they 
loaned the money for a short time before passing it on.  This gave them little or no incentive to 
ensure that did not issue loans to overly risky borrowers.  The Credit Risk Retention Act aims to 
solve this problem by ensuring that each creditor in the lending process holds a share of the 
risk, thus giving them an incentive to keep the overall risk level down. 
Let us examine a situation where a mortgage broker has the option to lend 1 unit to a borrower 
who has a 40% default probability.  When the mortgage broker can pass on the risk of this 
mortgage, there is no incentive for him to deny a borrower with such a high default probability.  
In this simple example, the broker sells the mortgage (likely to a company looking to package it 
and sell it in a CMO or similar structured asset-backed security) for a small return (5% for 
simplicity’s sake).  In this example, all of the risk is passed on and the broker earns a positive 
return:   
Borrower probability of default: .4 
Expected return:  1(1.05) = 1.05 
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Now let us consider what would happen in this same scenario if the broker was forced to keep 
20% of the loan on his books, investing it at a rate that would give him a lower 2,5% real rate of 
return over the life of the loan.  With a 40% default rate, the broker can expect a negative 
return on the 1 unit: 
Expected return:  1(.84) + .6(.205) = .963 
With these assumptions it is possible to find the default rate at and above which lenders will 
not have any incentive to lend.  Let z represent that default level.        
1(.84) + (1-z)(.205) = 1 
1 – z =.7804 
z = .2196       
In this example, if mortgage brokers are required to keep a 20% interest in their loans, they will 
not lend to borrowers with an expected default rate above 21.96%.  As lenders are required to 
hold a larger share of the risk, they will lose the incentive to offer risky loans.  This will give 
them an incentive to tackle the adverse selection problem associated with subprime mortgage 
loans.  It will be beneficial for lenders to invest costly resources such as time and capital to 
ensure that they offer loans to borrowers with a lower level of risk.  This may be done by some 
combination of monitoring, or by demanding a positive signal and risk sharing from the 
borrower such as requiring a significant down-payment.  It will also give upstream risk holders 
(those that buy the majority of the loans from others) a greater incentive to monitor their 
downstream agents to ensure that they are doing a good job. 
Another issue is why the buyers of these risky loans, who actually became the lenders, seemed 
to not realize or not care that these loans often had such a high probability of default.  The 
simple answer, in many cases, is that the buyer either did not know the default probability, or 
did not care about the default probability since they also transferred the risk of these loans by 
packaging and selling the loans in structured financial products.  In the instances where an 
initial buyer planned on packaging and passing on the loans shortly after purchase, there was 
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little incentive to ensure that the loans they were buying met even the lowest of standards. 
Another explanation is that they actually believed that the packaging of the loans would 
provide sufficient protection for those holding the upper tranches of the securities.  In reality it 
was likely a combination of the two as it seems as though many of the issuers of these 
securities underestimated their risk as they both kept large portions of their own products on 
their books, and purchased structured products from other firms.  A good example of this is 
Lehman Brothers which in addition to selling structured financial products, held large amounts 
of these products such as CMOs and credit default swaps on their books.  This ended up 
becoming the main cause of Lehman’s downfall when the financial crisis hit.80  
This legislation also affects the previously described situation by forcing issuers of these 
securities to hold a substantial portion of these loans on their books.  This should function in a 
similar manner to the previously described situation, causing these firms to screen the loans 
they buy for default probability.  The legislation will also likely cause firms to offer smaller 
amounts of all types of structured financial products for sale, as investors, now aware of the 
amount of risk that they have the potential to carry, will not want to invest in derivative 
packaging companies with large amounts of these assets on their books.        
5.1.1. Potential issues 
One “side-effect” of imposing risk-retention requirements on creditors is that it has the 
potential to restrict credit liquidity in many ways.  First, it will do so in a similar way to what 
reserve requirements for banks do by limiting the amount of funds that loan givers have to use 
to offer more credit.81  It will also do so by raising the minimum standards required for people 
to receive loans, leaving a larger percentage of the population without credit to spend.  As 
mentioned before, the more risk lenders hold, the more effort they will be willing to invest in 
order to ensure that they do not offer loans to borrowers with a level of risk that will lead to a 
negative expected return for them.  However, this only works to the point where lenders are 
still able to make a positive expected return.  As risk-retention levels become higher and higher, 
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increased competition among lenders to offer loans to low-risk borrowers will cause returns on 
loans to fall as low risk borrowers will be able to choose between many competing lenders.  
Less efficient lenders may go out of business as the return that they receive is not enough to 
offset the cost that is required to insure a maximum level of risk.  As there are fewer loans 
offered, each with lower levels of return, there will be fewer structured financial products with 
high-risk, high-yield loans backing them.  As mentioned before, the supply of structured 
financial products will also be reduced by curbing the demand for these loans by the firms that 
package structured financial products as they will be wary of holding risky assets on their books 
both because of the inherent risk, and because of the negative effect it could have on their 
stock price due to investors wariness of structured financial products. This contraction in supply 
of investment vehicles will also likely have the effect of driving up the prices, and thus 
decreasing the returns offered by investing in other types of bonds and securities.  
This is not so much a side-effect as it is a desired outcome in markets that have experienced 
bubbles due to the fact that they were previously overly liquid.  Still, attention must be given to 
ensure that credit markets are not suffocated by imposing overly high requirement levels, as 
we see today in the post-financial crisis world that many countries, including the United States 
are still struggling to find fuel to stimulate growth in the economy.  Central interest rates have 
remained at extremely low levels as countries attempt to pump credit into their economies and 
concurrently devalue their currency in an attempt to stimulate growth through exports. It is a 
common opinion that much of the world is in a currency war as of the fall of 2010, leading to 
fears of large scale inflation in the future.  Achieving the appropriate level of liquidity in credit 
markets is a balancing act, just as achieving the appropriate level of inflation is.  
 
5.2. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 
Amends the Commodity Exchange Act to require joint regulation of swap markets by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). 
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Requires swap repositories, swap dealers, major swap participants, and swap execution 
facilities to register with the CFTC. 
Repeals the exemption from CFTC regulation of derivatives transaction execution facilities and 
boards of trade. 
Authorizes the CFTC and the SEC to ban abusive swaps. 
Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to repeal the prohibition on regulation of security-
based swaps and applies specified requirements to such swaps. 
     –Library of Congress82 
These measures will force major swap participants, defined as anyone who maintains a 
substantial net portion in swaps, exclusive of hedging for commercial rick, or those whose 
positions create such significant exposure to others that it requires monitoring; to be subject to 
regulation such as capital standards, margin requirements, and record keeping and reporting 
requirements.83  
Another main function of the bill is that it will force major swap participants to trade on a 
standardized clearing platform which will be monitored.   
The purpose of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 is to reduce systemic 
risk. It aims to do this by increasing transparency which acts to reduce asymmetric information 
in the market for credit default swaps.  It also attempts to ensure that losses are not spread 
throughout the financial system by enforcing capital requirements which will make it more 
likely that participants will have the ability to cover losses, and by having clearinghouses to deal 
with losses if a participant does default.  It also gives regulators the power to terminate the 
actions of any participant in the swap market that poses a significant threat to the financial 
system, and aims to ensure that all major swap participants hold a share of the risk.    
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One of the main issues with the credit default swap market has been its existence as an over-
the-counter market which has made it more difficult to regulate due to a lack of transparency.  
This lack of transparency has made it difficult for regulators to detect and prove any alleged 
market manipulation, as well as made it hard for both regulators and market participants to 
know all of the parties involved in any particular transaction.84  There have also been problems 
with adverse incentives as there have been allegations that speculative swap traders would 
attempt to drive a company or security into default with well timed naked swap purchases.85  
This is one costly example of the market manipulation that can occur in markets with a lot of 
market friction.  Another intended benefit is that the market will more accurately reflect the 
real price of a given asset, and that market outsiders will no longer be able to take advantage of 
the pricing of the market without participating in the price discovery process themselves.86  
Forcing major swap participants to trade through clearing houses is intended to reduce 
systemic risk for a number of reasons.  For one, clearing houses act as counterparties to trades 
and take on the responsibility of default by one of the counterparties, preventing the spread of 
systemic risk.87  In this capacity, clearing houses also diversify and manage the risks of these 
counterparties, and can help to monitor these counterparties by either providing useful 
information to regulators, or by preventing certain counterparties from taking on additional 
risk.88  They can also facilitate netting of collateral requirements across different 
counterparties.89   
Requiring all market participants to register with the CFTC and conducting transactions in the 
open through a third party are the first steps toward gaining an overview of the market and 
how it functions.  Also, in addition to these systemic risk minimizing capabilities, the existence 
of clearing houses will help to minimize the amount of market manipulation by forcing firms to 
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divulge their actions, and thus their motives to a third party.  This means that this information 
will be available to the regulators at the SEC and the CFTC who are mandated to ban abusive 
transactions, and if necessary, punish market participants that engage in such transactions. 
Punishing such firms that engage in abusive swaps aims to prevent moral hazard by making the 
expected value of such actions negative.  The bill also threatens to deny market access to firms 
that pose a threat to the market as a whole, and in conjunction with other parts of the bill 
addressing systemic risk, firms posing too large of a risk can even be terminated.  Assuming 
firms’ decision makers have the best interest of the firm in mind; this should be a substantial 
motivation for firms to become more risk averse.   
5.2.1. Potential issues 
There are several issues that arise from forcing standardized derivatives contracts to be settled 
through clearing houses.  One large issue revolve around how these third party clearing houses, 
also known as central counterparties (CCPs) or Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs) would be 
administered.  It has been decided that these CCPs will be private, for-profit organizations 
rather than public utilities.  This could lead to problems similar to those seen in the credit 
ratings industry.  Conflicts of interest often arise when regulatory authority and public 
responsibility are given to companies which are also looking to grow and earn profit.  For 
instance, there is some concern that CCPs could attempt to lure additional business by 
competing on offering the lowest possible collateral margin requirements.90  Doing this would 
drastically increase the level of risk CCPs were exposed to leading to an increased likelihood 
that obligations could not be covered by CCPs in the event of a large amount of defaults from 
one or more large counterparties. 
An important issue that must be addressed is to determine which derivative products will be 
handled by clearing houses and which will not.  Under the original proposal CCPs would decide 
this, as any product that is accepted by one CCP will set a precedent that it is a standardized 
product and will thus be seen as such from that point forward.91  If for-profit organizations are 
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left to decide which products they will clear, some claim that they will likely clear as many 
products as possible in order to make the most money.92  This could overwhelm the industry 
with products that it doesn’t fully understand, as occurred in the credit ratings industry. 
While clearinghouses are likely to reduce systemic risk spread from market participants, their 
interconnectivity to all market participants make them a huge danger to the system if they 
were to fail.  If a large, interconnected clearinghouse were to fail it would almost certainly 
prompt a bailout from the government.  It can be argued that since CCPs will be the ones 
holding the risk of the market, they would have the incentive to keep risk levels low, even if it 
means passing up short-term profits.  However, this argument is only likely to come true if CCPs 
do not fall victim to moral hazard themselves.  If firms give bailouts a reasonable probability in 
their risk evaluation it can lead to moral hazard.  In this case it would be necessary for 
regulators to keep a close watch on CCPs to ensure that all necessary safeguards are in place, 
and that moral hazard does not come into play.93 
Assuming these moral hazard issues can be avoided; there are still other issues with using CCRs 
in such an important capacity.  In light of the complicated nature of the products CCPs will be 
dealing with, it may be wise to be skeptical about their ability to accurately manage the risk 
associated with those products.  In order for CCPs to manage the risks associated with clearing 
a product, they need “to be able to model the product’s potential behavior, which requires 
good historical and current prices and an ability to understand and estimate possible future 
price movements, including in stress environments.”94  This information is very difficult to come 
across in such a market.   This issue should be particularly apparent in light of credit rating 
agencies’ and most of the financial market’s problems assessing the risk inherent in many types 
of derivatives.  Combined with the finite nature of their capital reserves, this could put CCRs in a 
situation where they needed a bailout even if they perform their jobs to the best of their 
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abilities.95  In order to combat this risk, clearing houses should be required to take preemptive 
measures beyond capital reserves, such as participant membership in emergency funding, a 
backup clearing fund, and collateral posting requirements to participants.96  
Another issue that has been brought up is the cost that this change will impose on the 
derivatives market.  While some claim that having standardized contracts trading through 
clearing houses will increase liquidity, others feel that the move to clearing houses can 
drastically reduce liquidity for those who need credit default swaps the most.97,98  For one 
thing, clearing houses are not as efficient as natural open market mechanisms are at 
transferring information.99 It has been argued that while transparency to regulators is desirable, 
transparency to the market as a whole could make it difficult for financial institutions to 
function properly if all market participants were aware of all of the institutions’ positions.100            
Many buyers have very specific, relatively illiquid demands to meet hedging requirements that 
standardized contracts cannot fulfill.101  It is argued that in the case of specialized contracts, 
having the information published for the market to see would actually lead to market 
manipulation as other traders move the market against the large contract, dramatically driving 
up the price.102  In such cases, these contracts may be forced to continue to operate over-the-
counter where they will face increased regulation and increased costs.  In addition to imposing 
additional costs on those who need credit default swaps the most, this also makes it more 
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difficult for innovations and expansions to occur in the market.  This has the potential to reduce 
liquidity in the swap market.103      
 
5.3. Accountability and Transparency in Ratings Agencies Act of 2009 
Increased Liability:  The bill enhances the accountability of Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSROs) by clarifying the ability of individuals to sue NRSROs.  The bill 
also clarifies that the limitation on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or any State 
not to regulate the substance of credit ratings or ratings methodologies does not afford a 
defense against civil anti-fraud actions.  
Duty to Supervise:  The bill adds a new duty to supervise an NRSRO's employees and authorizes 
the SEC to sanction supervisors for failing to do so.  
Independent Board of Directors:  The bill requires each NRSRO to have a board with at least one-
third independent directors and these directors shall oversee policies and procedures aimed at 
preventing conflicts of interest and improving internal controls, among other things.  
Mitigate conflicts of interests: The legislation also contains numerous new requirements 
designed to mitigate the conflicts of interest that arise out of the issuer-pays model for 
compensating NRSROs. Additionally, the bill significantly enhances the responsibilities and 
accountability of NRSRO compliance officers to address conflicts of interest issues.  
Greater Public Disclosure: As a result of the bill, investors will gain access to more information 
about the internal operations and procedures of NRSROs. In addition, the public will now learn 
more about how NRSROs get paid.  
Revolving-Door Protections: When certain NRSRO employees go to work for an issuer, the bill 
requires the NRSRO to conduct a 1-year look-back into the ratings in which the employee was 
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involved to make sure that its procedures were followed and proper ratings were issued. The bill 
also requires NRSROs to report to the SEC, and for the SEC to make such reports public, the 
names of former NRSRO employees who go to work for issuers.  
  -The House of Representatives Financial Services Committee104 
Requires the SEC to: (1) conduct periodic reviews of NRSRO compliance with the look-back 
requirement; (2) establish an office that administers SEC rules governing NRSRO practices; (3) 
require each NRSRO to disclose publicly information on initial ratings and subsequent changes 
to such ratings; and (4) prescribe rules requiring each NRSRO to adopt certain credit ratings 
methodologies that include risk assessment and the assumptions underlying the procedures and 
methodologies used to determine a credit rating. 
  -Library of Congress105 
This bill is aimed at correcting the many principal-agent problems that were apparent in the 
NRSRO ratings system prior to the financial crisis.  It attempts to do so in large part by making 
NRSROs more accountable for their actions, both to regulators and to the public, and by 
improving the quality of the methodologies used by NRSROs in rating structured financial 
products.     
An increased focus on the methodologies that NRSROs employ in rating structured financial 
products should help in several ways.  The most direct way is by helping to mandate the use of 
what are hopefully the best methodologies available.  As described, there will be additional 
focus on risk assessment, and particular focus on the assumptions that are so important to 
ratings.  Conducting sensitivity analysis with the main assumptions for example, should help 
raters to see how sensitive many of the products they rate are to different economic conditions 
and allow the raters to more accurately account for this risk.  Additionally, a standardized 
methodology should make it more difficult for ratings agencies to give high ratings in order to 
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secure customers because they will need to justify any ratings that deviate from the ratings that 
should be attained by following normal procedures.  This will make both the agencies and those 
in charge of specific ratings more easily accountable for any moral hazard.   
One of the main issues that this bill addresses is the conflict of interests that arises from the 
issuer-pays model of compensation for ratings.  While the bill does not prohibit this system 
completely, it mandates regulators to: 
“prohibit, or require the management and disclosure of, any conflicts of interest relating to the 
issuance of credit ratings by a NRSRO including— 
(A) Conflicts of interest relating to the manner in which a NRSRO is compensated by the obligor, 
or any affiliate of the obligor, for issuing credit ratings or providing related services; 
(F) Rules providing for the establishment of a system of payment for each NRSRO that requires 
that payments are structured in a manner designed to ensure that the NRSRO conducts 
accurate and reliable surveillance of ratings over time, as applicable, and that incentives for 
reliable ratings are in place;”106 
This bill does not specify exactly how these issues will be solved.  Instead it mandates that the 
SEC must implement the necessary rules in order to eliminate conflicts of interest.  While the 
exact measures that the SEC will take are still not known at this point, it is clear that it will 
involve a significant amount of direct oversight.  This would be similar to the example given in 
section on moral hazard where a bank/regulator could choose to invest in a monitoring 
technology.  As in that example, if this is the only method that is employed, it is likely to be 
quite costly as it would take a large amount of resources for the SEC to closely monitor every 
rating given by each NRSRO.  It would also be very costly for the SEC to closely follow each 
rating after it was given to ensure that NRSROs conduct proper surveillance and adjustments to 
ratings after they have been issued.  Instead, it would be beneficial for regulators to implement 
a system which would provide the proper incentives to NRSROs to provide and maintain 
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accurate ratings.  The fact that there are no suggestions of this sort makes it difficult to know 
the likely effectiveness of this part of the legislation. 
Another thing that the bill will require is more stringent reporting requirements.  NRSROs will 
be required to publicly disclose a large amount of information, including their methodologies, 
their sources of income, and any services other than ratings provided to issuers.  This will make 
it easier for those who depend on ratings to monitor NRSROs by reducing the amount of 
asymmetric information.  It should help to ensure that particular NRSROs are using the best 
methodologies because investors who disagree with the methodologies used by a particular 
agency can punish that agency either by voicing their displeasure publicly, or by pressuring 
issuers to not get rated by the agency in question by refusing to hold debt issued by an issuer 
that is rated by that particular agency.  Investors will also be able to determine whether or not 
they will punish raters and/or issuers for potential conflicts of interest such as those that could 
arise from issuers paying ratings agencies for additional services.     
Increasing the liability of NRSROs and their regulators by making them more susceptible to suits 
should help to incentivize NRSROs to provide the best possible ratings by adding an additional 
element of risk to any decision that does not have investors’ best interests in mind.  The same 
can be said about regulators who would be more susceptible to fraud-based suits.  This should 
discourage NRSROs from giving artificially high ratings in order to attract or retain business by 
making the potential costs of such practices higher than the benefit.   
One of the actions designed to increase the liability of NRSROs is the repeal of Rule 436(g) 
under the securities act of 1933.  Rule 436(g) protected NRSROs from liability when the ratings 
they provided were included into a Securities Act registration statement or prospectus.107  
Without this protection, NRSROs would be subject to liability for misstatements or omissions if 
their ratings were included in official documentations issued by rated companies.  Including 
ratings in periodic reports and registrations are important for companies as it can have an 
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effect on the company’s liquidity, cost of funds, or covenants in its debt instruments.108  The 
intention of this piece of legislation is to ensure that NRSROs do not provide any misstatements 
or omit any vital information in an effort to appease the firms which they are competing to 
serve, or in an effort to cut corners in an effort to save on costs.  
The bill also cracks down heavily on individuals working in NRSROs.  It requires all NRSRO 
employees to be supervised and gives the SEC the power to sanction supervisors who don’t 
maintain strict standards for employees.  It also mandates that NRSROs investigate the ratings 
of individuals that leave to work for an issuer, in order to ensure that all ratings issued by the 
former employee were done correctly.  This will hopefully eliminate the possibility for issuers to 
bribe individual employees into giving good ratings in exchange for a future job by making it 
extremely costly for that individual if they are caught.    
Additionally, NRSROs will be required to have independents comprise at least one-third of the 
board of directors.  These members will attempt to ensure that management of NRSROs are 
responsible for adhering to regulations in addition to profitability.  
5.3.1. Potential issues 
There are several issues that this legislation still leaves unresolved.  While the proposal aims to 
eliminate principal agent problems that exist between ratings agencies and investors, there is 
still uncertainty as to how effective these measures will be at accomplishing their objectives.  It 
also still leaves much to be desired in terms of solving many fundamental problems behind the 
ratings system as a whole.   
For one, legislation mandates that ratings agencies must adopt certain methodologies that 
focus more on risk in order to strengthen the quality of their ratings.  In principle, this should 
only be a positive step.  In practice however, set methodologies, no matter how detailed they 
are, may still fall short of providing accurate information that can lead to accurate, useful 
ratings.  This is not necessarily due to the methodologies (although the exact methodologies 
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that would be used are still uncertain), but rather because there is so little data for models 
measuring the risk to be based upon.  In fact, useful historical data is lacking on both the 
structural performance of the securities, and on the underlying assets that comprise the 
securities.109  Also, standardized methodologies could make NRSROs less adaptable to rating 
different variations of structured financial products.  This could lead to future problems if 
agencies adhere to obsolete methodologies in order to rate new types of products.  If 
standardized methodologies are to be required, then there must be a system for adjusting 
these methodologies or creating new ones in response to new structured financial products.   
Another issue is that these methodologies are to be publicly disclosed so that investors can 
determine for themselves which agencies and ratings they will choose to trust.  Once again, 
ideally this is a good thing, but since these methodologies could potentially still be using 
relatively unreliable data, this could have the unintended consequence of giving investors a 
false sense of confidence in ratings, helping to spread systemic risk and fuel asset bubbles.  
Also, more standardized, public methodologies will not prevent issuers from tailoring their 
products to achieve a certain rating.  All it will do is make this process easier by eliminating the 
need for issuers to consult with ratings agency employees in order to do so.   
NRSROs will also be required to report and manage potential conflicts of interest, including 
those that may occur from the “issuer pays” system, and those that arise from providing 
additional services to issuers such as advisory.  Once again, this is a good idea in principle, 
leaves many questions in addition to the answers that it provides.  Stating that NRSROs are 
required to do these things does not guarantee satisfactory results.  A good example of this is 
the International Organization of Securities Commission’s (IOSCO) Code of Conduct created in 
2004 as a voluntary code of conduct for ratings agencies.110  Although the code was voluntary, 
it still demonstrated how the agencies that agreed to it failed to live up to their obligations by 
often reporting their methodologies and issues in vague and self-serving manners.111  The 
Credit Rating Reform Act also had similar methods aimed at achieving similar goals, but failed 
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to make significant changes.  As long as conflicts of interest exist among NRSROs, it is likely that 
at least some will try to get around the regulation.   
The increased liability for both the ratings agencies and for regulators should be a positive step 
in increasing the risk associated with providing inaccurate information, or in neglecting to 
provide thorough oversight. However attempts to increase this risk have potentially serious 
consequences.  Since the repeal of 436(g) which became effective in July 2010, there has 
effectively been a stalemate between NRSROs and companies that disclose credit ratings in 
their SEC statements.112  This causes a temporary standstill in the market for investment grade 
debt and asset-backed securities which was only relieved by a no-action letter issued shortly 
after the legislation was enacted.113  It is clear that a more permanent solution will need to be 
put in place before the no-action letter expires on January 24, 2011 in order to avoid fallout 
from an extended breakdown of the effected securities markets.   
While regulation that reduces asymmetric information is always positive, the proposed 
regulation falls short in that it does not fundamentally help to eliminate many of the conflicts of 
interest that are prevalent in the ratings industry.  As long as the current “issuer pays” system is 
in effect, there will be conflicts of interest that threaten the quality of ratings.  This is a difficult 
problem however, as it is not easy to change a system that has been built on this payment 
method for such a long time.  Shifting the payment system back to the “investor pays” system is 
not very practical today either.  In a time where there is so much reliance on ratings and so 
much technology that allows information to be transmitted quickly and easily, it would be 
difficult for a ratings agency to get a fair price for its ratings from only investors that pay for its 
services, as it is likely that a secondary market for passing on this information could develop.  
The “investor pays” system is also not without possible conflicts of interest of its own.  
Investors limited to the grade of securities that they can invest in, either through regulatory or 
internal controls, could put pressure on ratings agencies to inflate ratings so that they could 
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broaden the range of securities that they could invest in.114,115  This would also help relieve 
some of the demand for the securities that were already rated AAA, resulting in slightly higher 
returns from those securities.  On the other side, investors could attempt to negatively 
influence ratings in order to enhance the returns on the securities they wish to purchase.116   
It seems clear that the quality of ratings would benefit from a system where the party making 
the payment is not inherently interested in the outcome of particular ratings.  One suggestion 
that could help to eliminate much of the conflict of interest involved in payment is one which 
creates a centralized clearing platform within the SEC or other regulatory body.117  This central 
agency would require flat fees for different types of ratings and would then choose a ratings 
agency to rate the security.  However, even this system is not without issues as a system for 
fairly choosing ratings agencies while incentivizing them to provide the best possible ratings 
would need to be developed which would be a difficult task in itself.               
Another issue closely related to the conflicts of interest issue, but not directly addressed in this 
legislation, is the issue of the level of competition in the credit ratings industry.  In recent years, 
the SEC has attempted to increase the level of competition within the certified ratings industry 
by making the requirements for achieving NRSRO status more clear and accessible.  The 
common wisdom is that increasing competition and increasing choice are positive things.  It is 
thought that increased competition would also ensure that NRSROs would be better at 
following up on ratings after the initial issuance.118  However, in the ratings industry with the 
“issuer pays” system still in effect, increasing competition can have the unintended 
consequence of worsening the shopping for ratings problem.  More competition may cause 
individual ratings agencies to go great lengths in order to please issuers and secure business.  
They may do so even in the face of direct oversight if they feel that not doing so will result in a 
worse outcome than getting caught by regulators would.  Increased competition would likely 
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also worsen the previously described issues related to an “investor pays” system.  However, 
increased competition could be positive under the central distribution system if an effective 
system for distributing business based on positive ratings performance could be found.   
Perhaps the main goal of this ratings industry regulation, and this financial regulation as a 
whole, is to reduce the spread of systemic risk.  Reliance on flawed credit ratings is one of the 
main contributors to the recent financial crisis.  It is true that as the quality of ratings increases, 
the risk associated with depending on them decreases.  That is what much of the current 
regulation aims to do.  However, the current regulation is leaving out one of the main issues 
related to risk spread by credit ratings, that being the huge reliance on NRSRO ratings by large 
investors such as banks, pension funds, and insurance companies who are required to invest in 
only investment-grade debt above a particular rating.  Also, as mentioned earlier non-regulated 
investors have also become highly dependent on NRSRO ratings.  These minimum rating 
requirements began prior to the development of most structured financial products.  When 
structured financial products came onto market and were rated under the same system as 
normal corporate bonds, it allowed these high risk products be placed on balance sheets where 
safe assets were supposed to be.  It is claimed that many of these regulated investors value 
credit ratings not for the information that they are supposed to provide, but rather for the 
purpose of achieving favorable regulatory treatment.119  The current regulation falls very short 
by not addressing this problem.   
One way that this problem could be eliminated is by taking regulatory responsibility out of the 
hands of private companies by shifting this responsibility to a public entity.  This would ideally 
allow credit rating agencies to return to their original purpose of eliminating asymmetric 
information by providing real information about credit worthiness rather than serving to reduce 
regulatory restrictions.  A public institution would also ideally be able to determine restrictions 
on regulated investors without being compromised by a drive to earn profit.     
Another, more moderate way to address this problem is to create separate scales for structured 
financial products, and creating different regulatory restrictions for regulated investors 
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investing in these products.  This is something that has been proposed before.  In 2008, the SEC 
proposed adding separate symbols to structured financial products.  However this proposal was 
not enacted.120  A similar proposal would be beneficial in several ways.  Firstly, it would provide 
additional information to less informed investors who might not realize the differences 
between structured products and corporate and municipal bonds.  Secondly, it would provide a 
basis for regulatory rules for regulated investors to be adjusted to a new system that could 
better insulate those regulated investors from the additional uncertainty inherent in structured 
financial products. Separating ratings into different classes based on their characteristics could 
also help to reduce systemic risk by reducing the vulnerability of other types of ratings when a 
particular class of assets is downgraded.  This is because investors may see the downgrading of 
a particular class or group securities or products to be isolated from others if they feel that 
different ratings scales are used to reflect the different characteristics of different products.   
5.4. Potential costs / Concerns  
The reason it is so important to analyze and weigh every piece of regulation is because every 
regulation has costs, both direct and indirect.  In terms of direct costs, while it is currently 
unknown how much government spending will need to increase in order to support the 
expanded role that the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory bodies are 
certain to play, it is sure to be considerable.  The size and overall amount of talent within these 
agencies will need to be greatly expanded to effectively take on the new responsibilities that 
have been given to them by the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  
These agencies need to be able to recruit and retain the best and brightest talent in order to 
stay on top of the highly dynamic and innovative US and world financial systems.  Companies 
affected by the regulation are also certain to have direct costs in order to comply with the new 
regulation.  They will need to hire new personnel to fill the man-hours lost by current personnel 
dealing with regulatory measures.  They will also need to hire new personnel, both as full time 
employees and as consultants who will specialize in compliance.  Hiring can be a good thing for 
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the economy as a whole, but only if it is not at the expense of growth and the hiring of other 
employees for other positions. 
Still, the largest costs related to the Dodd Frank bill are likely to be the indirect costs that come 
from increased market frictions.  Market frictions are defined as anything that interferes with a 
normal flow of trade.121  One market friction that could result from the regulation discussed 
here is a reduction in the amount of credit available to fuel investment.  In this case, as 
mentioned before, slowing down reckless lending through risky investment vehicles that spread 
systemic risk and fuel asset bubbles is one of the main objectives.  However, it is important that 
this combination of regulation does not contract credit too much at the risk of slowing down 
the recovery and future growth of the economy.  
Regulation can also change the competitive dynamics of markets.  This is especially true and 
potentially costly due to the current, relatively open global economy.  Regulatory arbitrage 
refers to the act of seeking out jurisdictions with fewer regulatory burdens in an attempt to 
reduce costs and gain a competitive advantage over competitors.122  If regulations in the US 
become too stringent, most of the market participants could leave to conduct their business 
elsewhere, causing adverse effects on the liquidity of those markets and overall growth 
potential of the economy.  Regulatory arbitrage can also cause the effectiveness of regulations 
to break down as regulators are forced to be more lenient in their standards in order to prevent 
market participants from leaving the market.123  This is one huge factor that advocates 
increased coordination and cooperation among policy makers and regulators around the 
globe.124 
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6. Insights 
On the most basic level, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is 
intended to improve the functioning of the US financial system when the entire bill is taken into 
account.  Though this paper only looked at part of the bill, it is clear that the regulations 
commissioned by the bill will have a significant effect on the areas it addresses.  However, it is 
still unclear whether these parts of the bill, and/or the bill as a whole will have a positive or a 
negative effect overall.  One reason that it is still very difficult to tell the effectiveness of the bill 
is because many of the actions that are described are not specified in writing, but will instead 
be created and put into place by regulatory authorities such as the SEC.  This makes it 
impossible to analyze the likely effects of these measures before they are actually put in place 
by these authorities.  The parts of the bill that are possible to analyze certainly have some 
promise in helping to solve the issues they were designed to solve, but many of them also seem 
poised to create unintended consequences that can put their net effectiveness in question.  The 
current regulation is in large part a balancing act which takes aim at solving problems witnessed 
in the recent past while trying to minimize collateral damage to other parts of the system.  The 
difficult thing is that it will likely force the US regulatory authorities to continue down a 
reactionary path of regulation where problems are solved only after they arise and cause 
damage.  
Effective regulation must not only concentrate on solving the problem at hand, but also focus 
on solving the root of that problem.  If the root of the problem is fixed, not only will the original 
problem be fixed, but so too will other problems stemming from the same core issue.  This is no 
simple task.  The designers of regulation should make use of the theoretical tools at their 
disposal to try and gain the greatest possible understanding of core issues such as information 
asymmetry, principal-agent problems, and systemic risk, in order to be more prepared to deal 
with these issues and the issues that they create.  One thing is certain, and that is that the 
modern financial system is dynamic.  Good regulation must place its main focus on the root 
issues in order to solve the issues of today while also attempting to prevent the issues of 
tomorrow.      
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